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Entity Regulation, Litigation Rights and the Changing Meaning of 
Professionalism at the Bar of England and Wales 
The Legal Services Act 2007 provided a framework for a liberalised marketplace for 
legal services. The most significant responses to this by the Bar appear in the Bar 
Standards Board Handbook, which was first released in January 2014. This included 
changes allowing for barristers to engage in litigation and enabling the Bar Standards 
Board to regulate entities rather than just individual barristers. This article places these 
changes within the existing theoretical understanding of the legal professions and 
professionalism, and argues that they open the door for a significant shift in the way that 
the discourse of professionalism is used in relation to the Bar.
The Bar Standards Board (BSB) released its new format of the Handbook in January 2014. 
This was a substantial rewriting of the rules and principles governing the Bar. A major impetus 
for those changes appears to be the need to comply with the recommendations of the Clementi 
Report and to implement a substantial new regime for regulating Alternative Business 
Structures. The Handbook has provided an opportunity for the BSB to significantly alter the 
way the profession is both defined and governed. These alterations include an increased 
regulation of unregistered barristers,1 the option for litigation rights (rights to prepare cases for 
filing, usually the preserve of solicitors), a duty to report the misconduct of other barristers, 
changes to responsibility for chambers management, and outcomes focused and risk-based 
regulation.2 This article will look at the rules, guidance and consultations relating to two of 
these changes: entity regulation and litigation rights, in order to argue that the changes are 
1 Marc Mason, ‘UK: Room at the Inns – The Increased Scope of Regulation under the new Bar 
Standards Board Handbook for England and Wales’ (2014) 17(1) Legal Ethics 143
2 Marc Mason, ‘Making Way for Change at the Bar: The Practical Implications of the new Bar 
Standards Board Handbook’ (2015) 31(3) Journal of Professional Negligence 139
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aligned with broader neoliberal3 tendencies and represent a critical moment in a shift from 
occupational to organizational professionalism. It will further argue that the BSB appears to be 
positioning itself to make the most of the emerging regulatory market place in light of such 
changes, to become the regulator of choice for legal professionals engaged in a broader range 
of legal work that would hitherto be associated with the Bar.  
By way of introduction it may be of assistance to examine key competing theories of the legal 
professions (or indeed of professions more generally) to provide a foundation for understanding 
regulatory approaches. Closure, or conflict, theories as exemplified by Abel, ‘focus on the 
nature and extent of occupational control over the supply of services’4 and essentially look at 
how professions gain legitimacy and use this legitimacy to control the market for services to 
3 Neoliberalism generally refers to the dynamic process of political, economic and social restructuring 
that emphasizes the market as the most appropriate and efficient institution for regulating social 
order and thus brings all human action within the domain of the market. As Webley (2015) points 
out “its Anglo-American, post-welfare, capitalist, right-leaning roots have dominated the 
intellectual realm where the market is deemed to be a neutral force for individual freedom and 
prosperity” (at p 2353). Baron (2014) points to a resultant wave of deregulation, privatisation, and 
the withdrawal of the state from areas of social provision internationally since the 1970s aided by 
the positioning and dominance of its apologists across a wide range of positions of policy 
influence, leading to a striking reshaping of ‘common sense.’ It is criticised as incorporating 
authoritarian and imperialistic tendencies, entrenching corporate freedoms at the cost of human 
freedom, and as overemphasizing individual responsibility whilst devaluing the importance of 
collective ideals and the democratic state. See Simon Springer, Kean Birch and Julie MacLeavy 
(eds), The Handbook of Neoliberalism (Routledge 2016); Lisa Webley, ‘Legal Professional 
De(re)regulation, Equality, and Inclusion, and the Contested Space of Professionalism within the 
Legal Market in England and Wales’ (2015) 83 Fordham Law Review 2349; Paula Baron ‘Sleight 
of Hand: Lawyer Distress and the Attribution of Responsibility’ (2014) 23(2) Griffith Law Review 
261; Simon Springer, Kean Birch and Julie MacLeavy (eds), Handbook of Neoliberalism 
(Routledge 2016).
4 Richard L Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (Basil Blackwell 1988), 19
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their own ends. This group of theories looks at how adversaries within classes compete within 
the marketplace, how they jostle for superior position, deploying strategies of social closure, 
closing off areas of work to outsiders through reserving activities for nominated professionals, 
and internally controlling that work.5  On this view the professional project sets out to control 
the market and improve the status of the profession. This is done through a process of first 
controlling production of producers, or controlling entry (formally through stated entry 
requirements or informally for example through conditions that require a financial commitment 
such as insecure income in early years), then by controlling production by producers.  The 
former provides an obvious mechanism for increasing income by reducing competition via a 
quasi-number cap on professionals who may compete with each other. It also serves to act as a 
control on the way the profession is perceived, through delineating the characteristics required 
of individuals to be admitted to the profession, and thus seeks to control the status of the 
profession. The latter similarly has a dual purpose of both limiting internal and external 
competition and enhancing status. One of the particular strengths of closure theories has been 
the extent to which they have acted as a counterbalance to functionalist theories which had 
been the dominant framework through which the professional framework had been constructed.
For structural functionalist theorists, notably Parsons, the professions have been seen as a 
benevolent ‘antidote to the insidious poison of selfish materialism’6, essentially framing 
professionalism as a counterbalance to the aims and needs of individual lawyers, and a way of 
working towards more socially useful and worthy ambitions through a professional project. In 
essence, professional organisation has been viewed through a vocational lens with a unifying 




approaches, and particularly their trait based nature can perhaps be seen in the Royal 
Commission on Legal Services defining what it considered to be the five main features of a 
profession: a governing body with powers over members, a specialised field of knowledge, 
control of admission through tests of competence, self regulation (leading to higher standards), 
and overriding responsibility to the client.7 Control by the profession is in service of the client 
and the rule of law rather than the profitability of individual professionals and the means by 
which they compete for business. 
The traits set out by the Royal Commission are discernible as clauses in neo-contractual theory, 
which could be said to be the more recent adopter of at least some elements of functionalist 
theory.8 Paterson describes professions, under this theoretical framework, as a combination of 
attributes orientated towards others and attributes which are self-orientated, to form a contract 
where the profession offers social goods such as access and a service ethos, but also has a 
corresponding and reciprocal interest in its own benefits such as status, rewards and autonomy. 
From time to time this contract gets renegotiated, but in periods of stability it becomes viewed 
as tradition.9 In this way these more current interpretations avoid the static nature both of the 
structural functional approach and the trait based approach. Paterson views this as a healthy 
and normal feature of professions, and one that the professions have to wrestle with. As a result 
he also sees benefit in a professional body that combines regulatory and representative 
functions, where both sides of the contract have to be examined and balanced by one body, 
producing a tension which leads to a healthy dialogue.10 
Whilst these theories pay close attention to the internal workings and motivations of the 
7 Royal Commission on Legal Services, Final Report, (HMSO 1979) as cited in Abel (n 3), 6-7




professions more recent research has focused on the broader setting in which the professions 
operate, and the discourse in which professionalism is located and created. Evetts11 in particular 
shifts the emphasis onto professionalism as a discourse, highlighting a key distinction as that 
between occupational professionalism and organizational professionalism. Taking this focus 
Evetts examines how the discourse of professionalism facilitates change and control of an 
occupation. This discourse can be deployed from within, as in occupational professionalism, 
or from ‘above’ as in organizational professionalism. Occupational professionalism represents 
the traditional discourse, particularly in professions such as law and medicine, whilst 
organizational professionalism can be discerned as an emerging form tied to a more managerial 
discourse. The former carries with it ideas of collegiality and trust in an individual practitioner, 
the latter carries ideas of standardization, quality control and hierarchy. 
Webley12 has charted a shift in discourse and reforms of the legal professions in England and 
Wales, noting a move to neoliberalism with desacralization and depoliticization, an emphasis 
on private solutions and consumer power and reification of the market as a ‘common sense 
totalizing force for good.’13 Sommerlad describes how through a managerial ideology, in which 
efficiency is prioritised and quality is relativized to gain meaning from only the consumer 
viewpoint then ‘in the name of the defence and ‘empowerment’ of the consumer, this 
entrepreneurial, minimal state has… violated the integrity of that part of the profession 
11 Julia Evetts, ‘Short Note: The Sociology of Professional Groups New Directions Professions: A 
More Pragmatic Approach to Defining the Field CS’ (2006) 54 Current Sociology 133; Julia 
Evetts, ‘A New Professionalism? Challenges and Opportunities’ (2011) 59 Current Sociology 
406.
12 Lisa Webley, ‘Legal Professional De(re)regulation, Equality, and Inclusion, and the Contested 
Space of Professionalism within the Legal Market in England and Wales’ (2015) 83 Fordham 
Law Review 2349
13 Ibid at 2353
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committed to public sector service.’14 This reification of the market and of business comes at 
a cost to notions of civic culture and welfarism, and a shift towards a service delivery where 
cost begins to take precedence over quality, and service of the needs of capitalism takes priority 
over the needs of the administration of justice.15 In this discourse we may well expect a shift 
in emphasis away from public service aspects of professionalism. Indeed the neoliberalised 
discourse provides a fertile ground for justification of a market focused approach to legal 
service provision, freeing lawyers to  service the market, rather than serve the public or the 
public good per se. Whilst commenting on this shift from professionalism to business-led 
service provision, Webley does however note that much of the Bar has, to date at least, resisted 
these changes.16 It is arguable that the regulatory structure of the Bar has enabled them to do 
so, and this article will explore whether recent changes to the regulatory regime may be a 
precedent condition for similar shifts at the Bar.  
This article explores two of the main changes introduced to the Bar in the most recent reforms, 
namely entity regulation, and litigation rights. It is argued that these changes in particular have 
the potential to allow for a shift in the discourse of professionalism at the Bar towards a more 
neoliberal discourse and from occupational to organizational form of professionalism. This is 
a process that has a reasonably long history, but it is the combination of these two changes, and 
particularly entity regulation, that provide the environment for a different form of 
professionalism to emerge as dominant. 
14 Hilary Sommerlad, ‘Managerialism and the Legal Profession: A New Professional Paradigm’ 
(1995) 2(2-3) International Journal of the Legal Profession 159, 181
15 Hilary Sommerlad, ‘The New “Professionalism” in England and Wales’ in Spencer Headworth, 
Robert Nelson, Ronit Dinovitzer, and David B Wilkins (eds), Diversity in Practice: Race, 
Gender, and Class in Legal and Professional Careers (Cambridge University Press 2016), 228
16 Webley (n 12), 2356
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Neo-liberal interests can be discerned in some of the underlying justifications for these changes 
in so far as they give an increased priority to market focussed arguments relating to the 
promotion of competition, larger units of production and avoidance of economic loss, with a 
shift in the construct of the professional from craftsman to business person and technician.  
These changes are in line with a shift to occupational professionalism and may see the 
profession itself losing some or much of its market control in favour of the promises that come 
with such a shift of innovation, empowerment and autonomy. These changes may make the 
Bar more susceptible to movements further in the direction of neoliberalism and 
deprofessionalisation through stratification, specialisation and a reliance on technicians and 
technology, with gains in efficiency, but with a consequent shift of focus away from 
traditionally occupational professionalism to an organizational focus. The next section will 
consider the changes in the Handbook and the ways in which they introduce greater market 
theory and occupational professionalism into the way in which contemporary Bar regulation is 
being constructed.
The Changes: Entity regulation
The major change introduced through the new handbook is entity regulation. Entity regulation 
is the terminology commonly adopted in the sector for the shift from regulation of individual 
lawyers (or partnerships in the case of solicitors) to regulation of corporate providers. These 
entities may either be lawyer17 owned and run, or, more controversially, owned by non-
lawyers. 
17 Lawyer is used as shorthand here (unless otherwise stated) for the professionals authorised to carry 
out reserved activities under the Legal Services Act 2007, for example practicing barristers, 
solicitors or legal executives. It should be noted that the title ‘lawyer’ is not protected in England 
and Wales and anyone may offer services under that title. 
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Traditionally a barrister would choose to either practice as an employed barrister or as a self-
employed barrister. Prior to the recent changes the predominant model of practice at the Bar 
has been that of the self-employed barrister, and indeed many of the additions to the Bar code 
of conduct since its creation in 1981 have had the effect of protecting that self-employed status.  
In that mode of practice the barrister is prohibited from entering into any form of partnership 
other than the very loose association found in chambers. This generally consists of a formal 
association whereby members share premises and facilities such as clerking, but are tied to 
each other’s fortunes in no other way: for example, no profit sharing or any form of joint 
liability. Furthermore barristers were unable when practicing in this way to form companies, 
so there was also no restriction on that liability. Employed barristers generally had other 
restrictions and their role was primarily to provide services to their employer, and not to 
members of the public. 
The current trajectory of changes can be traced back to the 1980 and 1990s when the 
professions’ monopolies came under increased scrutiny. Calls for fusion of the professions 
heightened under the Prime Ministership of Thatcher, and particular under Lord Mackay as 
Lord Chancellor. Following an increase in legal aid over the preceding decades the Thatcher 
government began to take action to reduce legal aid and to increase competition in the 
profession (both of which subsequently continued under the New Labour administration), and 
the logic of the market began to take hold. As franchising and fixed fees came into operation 
the competition between solicitor-advocates, with their recently increased rights of audience, 
and barristers heightened. Employed barristers also gained the ability to advise clients of their 
employers around this time, and direct access to the bar began to broaden, meaning lay clients 
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could instruct barristers without going via a solicitor intermediary.18 In 2009 there was a further 
raft of changes whereby barristers were permitted: to be: managers, employees, and 
shareholders of Legal Disciplinary Partnerships; to work in dual capacity (i.e. to be both 
employed and self-employed); to work in partnerships; to share premises; to conduct 
correspondence; and to attend police stations.19 
The extent to which these changes have impacted on the work of barristers has largely gone 
unexamined.20 All of these activities had previously been prohibited for the self-employed 
barrister and had combined to significantly shape their practice and market position. Some of 
these prohibitions were more restrictive than the better known restriction on the conduct of 
litigation, which after all only affects matters entering the court system, and has no affect on 
(for example) advisory work, transactional work or non-court dispute resolution or prevention. 
Some of the prohibitions produced a dependency on other legal professions (for example 
prohibitions on attendance at police stations and the conduct of correspondence produce a 
reliance on solicitors) and others effectively limited the business model of the barrister to that 
of a sole trader with unlimited liability. Basic innovations of company law and capitalism 
therefore fell beyond the reach of the barrister (or alternatively the barrister fell beyond the 
reach of those innovations), who could claim to remain distanced in that way from the 
commercial world. 
18 Richard L Abel, English Lawyers Between Market and State: The Politics of Professionalism (OUP 
2004
19 Ruth Deech, ‘How the Legal Services Act 2007 has Affected Regulation of the Bar’ (2011) 11 
Legal Information Management 89
20 Although see for example: Atalanta Goulandris, ‘Reshaping Professionalism: Branding, Marketing 
and the New Entrepreneurial Barrister’ (2015) 22(3) International Journal of the Legal 
Profession, 272; and Fernanda Pirie and Justine Rogers (2013) Pupillage: The Shaping of a 
Professional Elite. In: Abbink J., Salverda T. (eds) The Anthropology of Elites. Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York 
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This traditional picture whilst removing barristers from a more sophisticated commercial 
market can be seen to have positioned them in what might be considered as a fairly classical 
model of a simple and controlled competitive market where a number of individual units all 
compete for business in their field in a fairly equal way. This description of course does not 
factor in issues such as the cultural capital that each unit brings to the market, but this is a 
weakness when applying simple market models to any field of activity, not just the Bar.  Now 
however, barristers can fall within this more sophisticated market arena and are likely to be 
subject to new pressures and market forces. They now have the potential to become employees 
in a broader sense than before, and the full suite of a barrister’s potential services become 
available to a mode of employed practice where they can be fully harnessed to generate profit 
for entities. The arguments surrounding these changes were persuasively explained within the 
context of market control theories and non-contractual theories,21 however the shift to an 
organizational focus means that theories based on discourses of professionalism might  provide 
a more suitable framework for analysis of the ongoing effects.
How has the Bar regulator explained this shift and what role does the Bar regulator, the BSB, 
consider itself to perform in this context? The expressed intention of the BSB is that it will 
retain a ‘niche’ status regulating entities which carry out activities similar to the traditional Bar 
‘which do not hold client money, whose structure is simple and transparent, with work being 
closely overseen by authorised individuals and minimal risk of divergent interests between 
owners and managers.’22 If both rules and policy documents are taken into account the 
authorisation process does seem to reflect this intention. The authorisation rules themselves are 
21 Abel, The Legal Profession (n3); Abel, English Lawyers (n16); Paterson (n 5)
22 Bar Standards Board, ‘Entity Regulation Policy Statement’, 
<https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1668991/entity_regulation_policy_statement.pdf
> accessed 5 January 2018
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relatively uninformative in this regard, simply setting up a framework which reflects the Legal 
Service Act 2007 framework for example requiring a Head of Legal Practice and Head of 
Finance and Administration, and binding owners and managers to the regulatory arrangements. 
The one rule that is reflective of the above statement is that which prohibits the holding of 
client money either directly or indirectly (other than through an appropriately managed third 
party payment service).23 The holding of client money in connection with a legal case has 
always been the preserve of solicitors in England and Wales.
Authorisation of an entity is a two step process that the BSB addresses through the criteria of 
eligibility and appropriateness or suitability. Once eligibility is determined under these 
mandatory rules then the BSB must determine whether the applicant entity is appropriate based 
on risk assessment, LSA 2007 regulatory objectives and the Entity Regulation Policy of the 
BSB, and if not appropriate then the BSB may choose not to authorise the entity.24 It is the 
Entity Regulation Policy which gives a clearer indication of what a BSB regulated entity ought 
to look like and clues about the traits that the BSB considers key to professionalism. The Entity 
Regulation Policy sets out the discretionary factors used for decision making. The factors are 
expressed as follows: 
‘14. The following factors, when present, would tend to indicate that it may be appropriate 
for the BSB to regulate an entity: 
a. all owners and all managers are individuals; 
b. 50% or more of the owners and 50% or more of the managers are entitled to exercise 
rights of audience in the Higher Courts; 
c. a substantial part of the services to be provided are advocacy and/or litigation services 
and expert legal advice; 
23 Bar Standards Board, Bar Standards Board Handbook (2015), 
http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1720092/bsb_handbook_april_2015.pdf,  rS83.5; 
Hereafter references to rules are to rules from this publication
24 Rule S99-100
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d. the entity is not intending to provide high-volume, standardised legal transactional 
services; 
e. 75% or more of owners and 75% or more of managers are authorised individuals; 
f. a substantial proportion of employees are going to be authorised individuals; and 
g. each manager supervises only a small number of employees.’ 25
These factors, along with the rules that apply to entities provide a more complete picture of 
what an entity will look like, which include the application of the cab-rank rule to regulated 
entities, which is seemingly employed to distinguish BSB authorised entities from other entities 
and to make these entities look like traditional barristers. The rule applies to the entities 
themselves, through a named authorised (BSB or non-BSB) individual, as well as individually 
to those authorised individuals working in a BSB entity.26 Although entity regulation is new, 
some of the features of the former system of regulation have been retained. 
There are also a number of firmer restrictions that have been imported from the self-employed 
model to the entity model that shape BSB regulated entities in the mould described. BSB 
authorised bodies, their managers, and barristers employed by them are forbidden from 
undertaking the management, administration and general conduct of client affairs, nor can they 
handle client money. 27 The only context in which barristers can undertake these activities is 
when they are working from a body authorised by another regulator, for example a body 
authorised by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA).28 Individual lawyers therefore 
become subject to the regulatory regime that has authorised the entity; barristers employed by 
25 Bar Standards Board, Entity Regulation Policy Statement (n 25)
26 Rule C29; Although on the extent to which the cab rank rule is applied in practice in any case see 
John Flood and Morten Hviid, ‘The Cab Rank Rule: Its Meaning and Purpose in the New Legal 
Services Market’ (January 22, 2013) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2205124 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2205124>
27 Rules S28-S29 and S31-S34 respectively 
28 Rule S35-S37
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an entity authorised under another regulator are freed from some of these restrictions that would 
have come with being regulated by the BSB if the entity’s regulator permits it, and others 
employed by the BSB regulated entity become restricted by rules heretofore reserved to 
barristers. Here we see early signs of what a central role entity regulation is to hold for the 
profession, an indication that the significance of an individual’s own professional status is 
likely to fade in the shadow of the status of the entity, which becomes the more important site 
of production and regulation. 
It can be noted that whilst moving away from a regulation of individuals who have been 
acculturated into the ethos of ‘their’ profession, towards entities which may naturally have a 
more profit driven ethos, the BSB has also expressed a preference for entities that seemingly 
demonstrate some features that might have been considered part of the trait-based or neo-
contractual theories of the professions. The favoured traits include: commitment to a ring-
fenced section of the market (the exercise of rights of audience; advocacy and litigation and 
prohibitions on conduct of affairs and handling of client money): commitment to high quality 
expert lead services rather than quantity (the high, albeit unspecified, supervision ratio; high 
individual authorisation ratio for employees and managers; and discouragement of high volume 
services): and an (albeit reduced) degree of independence from external influences (the high 
individual authorisation ratio for owners and managers and the cab rank rule). Here the 
discourse that has traditionally attached to individual practitioners now attaches to the entity, 
an emphasis is placed on individual professionals as owners and managers of these entities, 
and trust and regulation shifts from the individual to the entity. 
Only time will tell the extent to which the Entity Regulation Policy factors are rigorously 
applied, although the initial two cohorts of approved entities suggests that the factors may serve 
more as an expression of an ideal than as strict criteria, and this too serves to highlight the 
14
importance of discourse rather than practice here.  Apart from the large proportion of single 
member entities there is already at least one entity (out of just 4 which are not single barrister 
entities) which, whilst no doubt a perfectly appropriate reserved legal service provider, does 
not seem to provide a close fit to the specific BSB model described; having no rights of 
audience itself, being run by individuals who appear to have no rights of audience in the High 
Court and seemingly focusing on transactional and advisory work.29
Whether or not the criteria are rigorously applied, this change, or set of changes, does have the 
potential to open up avenues for real change in the way that barristers practice, and has more 
disruptive potential at the Bar than it did for solicitors. This is because the background to which 
the changes are being applied, as described above, makes it distinct from the equivalent 
changes for solicitors. When the SRA began regulating new entities it was suggested that this 
was a change that offered considerable benefits for the larger firms, which for solicitors were 
already in existence. This was said to be because it would allow growth and diversification 
through more funding opportunities, allow branding initiatives to operate in new ways, or 
allowing the realisation of capital through flotation on the stock market.30 All barristers 
however, as described above, were more akin to sole practitioner solicitors, and the predicted 
benefits of entity regulation, other than any tax related benefits of incorporation are less 
obvious to these existing practitioners. 
Entity regulation therefore shows some retention of the traditional model, but it is unclear at 
29 Bar Standards Board, BSB Entities Register (as at 18/06/2015); 
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1663530/bsb_entities_register__final___table_for
mat_.xlsx  Accessed 22nd June 2015; Elderflower Legal and Secretarial Services, 
http://elderflowerlegal.co.uk/ Accessed 3rd August 2015
30 Nick Jarrett-Kerr, ‘Alternative Business Structures: the Long Pregnancy’(2011) 11(2) Legal 
Information Management 82
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this stage whether this is based on the competitive advantage of the rhetoric of this model or a 
public service ethos. Regardless of this, the shift to the larger unit of production without doubt 
opens up scope for the services of barristers to become profit points for an entity and to 
therefore become subject to priorities of efficiency. In turn this may result in barristers now 
becoming forced to act as business people exposed to market pressures and competition, or 
employees subject to bureaucracy; in either of these cases the nature of the role would be 
shifting away from traditional models of occupational professionalism towards a more 
organizational model of professionalism. Here the interests of the BSB are not necessarily 
aligned to those of the profession itself. If organizational professionalism becomes the 
dominant discourse (or if it has already done so), then the BSB’s shift of focus from individual 
to entity regulation may position it better in a regulatory marketplace where the regulators 
themselves are in competition. It therefore seems likely that any resistance to such a shift would 
need to come from the members of profession itself, possibly coalescing around the Inns of 
Court.
The Changes: The Scope of Litigation Rights
As previously indicated, another big change via the Handbook has been the inclusion of the 
reserved activity of litigation rights for barristers, which has hitherto been the work of 
solicitors. The BSB has suggested that the introduction of litigation rights, is one of the most 
significant changes that they have brought in, expressing the view that this ‘will do much to 
help to promote competition in the provision of one-stop advocacy and litigation services. 
Widening the range of choice available - for the Bar and public too - will bring great benefits 
to barristers and clients alike.’31 The themes of competition and consumer choice are therefore 
31 Bar Standards Board, Bar Standards Board Annual Report 2013-14 (2014) 
<https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1606527/bsb_annual_report_2013-14.pdf> 
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strong drivers or justifications for this change, and in this quote they are combined with an 
implicit invitation to the Bar to step away from traditional models of practice, and perhaps 
traditional values. 
The 2010 Regulating Entities consultation paper considers the main aspects of litigation that 
were prohibited for barristers to be:
‘Issuing any claim or process or application notice, Signing off on a list of disclosure,
Instructing expert witnesses on behalf of a lay client, Accepting liability for the payment 
of expert witnesses, and Any other “formal steps” in the litigation of a sort that are 
currently required to be taken either by the client personally or by the solicitor on the 
record.’ 32
The latter covers the definition found in statute and case law33 of issuing, commencing, 
prosecuting or defending proceedings, and the formal steps needed to carry out those activities.
Litigation rights were previously unavailable for self-employed barristers under rule 401(b)(ii) 
of the old rules, although employed barristers were allowed to conduct litigation provided that 
they had spent at least 12 weeks working under the supervision of a qualified person. Rule 
S24.3.b now allows self-employed barristers to conduct litigation if they have obtained an 
extension to their practicing certificate and they have notified the BSB of their intention to do 
so.34 
32 Bar Standards Board, Regulating Entities, (Dec 2010) 
<https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/938873/regulating_entites_-
_consultation_paper_-_151010.pdf>, 24 
33Legal Services Act 2007, Sch 2 Para 4; Agassi v Robinson (Inspector of Taxes) [2005] EWCA Civ 
1507
34 A strict reading of the rules, taking into account the placement of the rule in the section on self-
employed barristers suggests employed barristers do not need to meet this requirement, however 
additional guidance published by the BSB states that if not already authorised under the old code 
of conduct they have to follow the same process (Bar Standards Board, Litigation Authorisation 
17
The criteria for eligibility for a litigation extension could have significant effects on the shape 
of practice, particularly at the junior end of the bar, but potentially for the Bar as a whole. 
Eligibility for a litigation extension is dependent upon having relevant administrative systems 
in place to provide legal services direct to clients and to administer litigation, and having the 
procedural knowledge to conduct litigation competently. If a barrister is less than three years 
standing she must also be working from the place of practice of a ‘qualified person’ who is 
authorised to exercise litigation rights35 and who can provide guidance.36 This is similar to the 
requirement for any practice within three years standing, and the requirements for the ‘qualified 
person’ differ only in so far as the qualified person must have litigation rights (but does not 
appear to need to have had them for a prescribed period.)37 Guidance published separately by 
the BSB38 explains that the mechanism for implementing these rules are that the barrister must 
provide the BSB with information that demonstrates they have the required knowledge. 
Completion of the BPTC and pupillage within the last three years will satisfy this requirement. 





37 The qualified person in both instances must have been entitled to practice, and have practised as a 
barrister or person authorised by another approved regulator for at least 6 of the previous 8 
years, and for the past two years must have made this her primary occupation. The additional 
requirement for litigation approval is that the person must themselves have entitlement to 
conduct litigation, but there is no required period (Rule S22.3.iii). This compares to rights of 
audience where the qualified person must have had full rights of audience for the past two years 
(Rule S22.2.ii)
38 BSB, Litigation Authorisation (n 34) 
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This means that once a chambers or entity has one experienced39 member with litigation rights 
and a system to deal with litigation (as they must if that experienced member has such rights), 
then any newly qualified barristers (unless they take a break of more than a year following the 
BTPC) will be eligible for a litigation extension upon completion of pupillage.40 These allows 
for exponential growth in full service litigation services to the public provided by BSB 
regulated entities.
The potential snowball effect of one or more members of any chambers obtaining authorisation 
is therefore not insignificant. This in itself has the potential to change the nature of early 
practice, with each barrister of over six years call being able to oversee three newly qualified 
barristers. There is potential here for the newly qualified barrister being persuaded to carry out 
more routine aspects of litigation, particularly in entities or in chambers where direct access 
becomes the norm. In doing so they face a potential risk to their own career development both 
in terms of building advocacy skills and building a solicitor client base. This in turn has the 
potential for segmentation of the Bar across longitude or cross section. In the former we could 
have an extended period of development where junior barristers spend longer under the 
patronage of their seniors, to whom they would remain useful as litigation assistants, almost 
akin to paralegals, before they eventually escape this neotenous phase and gain the 
opportunities to develop their broader skills. In the latter there is the possibility of some 
barristers remaining in this supportive role and the development of a less prestigious career 
track. 
It is interesting to note that there is a minimisation of the practical scope of the litigation 
39 Defined in Rule S22.3 as a barrister or other authorised person who has practiced for the last 2 years 
and at least 6 of the last 8 years, who is authorised to conduct litigation, and is not acting as a 
qualified person for more than two other people. 
40 A barrister can only act as a qualified person for three other barristers at a time. 
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restriction in the Regulating Entities consultation paper. In making the case that the restrictions 
on litigation are relatively narrow the paper points to the main restrictions being that a barrister 
cannot issue proceedings and cannot go on record as the person in charge of the ligitation. The 
consultation paper goes on to say that ‘The effect of this is that a self-employed barrister can 
handle all of the correspondence in a case, collect evidence and handle the advocacy… 
However, they would require a solicitor to bridge the gap and actually issue proceedings or 
take other formal steps.’41 This is arguably a very narrow and formalistic interpretation of the 
impact of these restrictions, and their real importance is that they require there to be some 
division of labour (and income). With such division being imposed it would be rare indeed for 
the solicitor to accept such a restricted role in a case, as the gap bridging role suggested, and 
the traditional restriction is likely to have been acting so as to give solicitors first refusal on 
much of the correspondence and evidence gathering described in that quote which would rarely 
be passed on to the barrister. Removing the monopoly on the gatekeeping role therefore has 
wider implications than those described in the consultation, and is likely to move the two 
branches of the professions to a more common, freer market.  
It is however unclear what the take up of litigation rights will be. As already mentioned, the 
corresponding introduction of Higher Rights of Audience for solicitors did not have the 
dramatic uptake that was expected or feared in some quarters. As at the 17th June 2015 (i.e. six 
months after they became available) 45 self-employed barristers had been authorised.42 The 
Barristers’ Working Lives survey43 found that 14% of barristers were planning to undertake 
41 BSB Regulating Entities (n 32), 25
42 Bar Standards Board, ’Barristers Authorised by the BSB to conduct litigation’ (June 2014) 
<https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1597601/barristers_authorised_by_the_bsb_to_
conduct_litigation_-_june_2014.xlsx> Accessed 6.9.14
43 Bar Standards Board and Bar Council, Barristers’ Working Lives (2013) 
<https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1597662/biennial_survey_report_2013.pdf> 
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litigation (with an additional 26% saying they ‘may’ do so). This was most common amongst 
criminal and family barristers. These are the same sectors that expressed dissatisfaction with 
life at the Bar with 32% and 26% respectively saying that they planned to leave the profession. 
Therefore, it is possible that the expressed intention to take up litigation rights may reflect a 
more general dissatisfaction with current practice in those areas rather than a focussed plan to 
develop an alternative model of delivery. The make-up of public access work (taking 
instructions from the public directly rather than via a solicitor) is also quite low, 77% of 
barristers undertake no public access work, and only 14% receive more than five percent of 
their income from public access work. 44 This could be because litigation restrictions have 
heretofore had a chilling effect on this work and as the potential arising from the combined 
liberalisations of these tasks becomes apparent, it may be that more barristers consider them to 
be attractive options. Interaction with the new opportunities of entity-based practice may also 
increase uptake and indeed, employers of barristers in entities may ultimately be the ones 
deciding on these issues with priorities which differ from those of self-employed barristers and 
which may take more notice of market pressures. 
The Changes: The Justification for Litigation Rights
Litigation rights have long been a strong point of distinction between the two major branches 
of the legal profession and their availability to barristers is a very recent turnaround. Arguably, 
this turnaround has come about to facilitate other changes (mainly the move to entity 
regulation) and to promote competition. In the ‘The Structure of Self Employed Practice’45 
consultation in August 2009 the BSB dealt swiftly with proposed litigation rights by saying:
44 Ibid 
45 Bar Standards Board, The Structure of Self-employed Practice: Consultation Paper (Aug 2009) < 
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1390774/structure_self-employed_bar.pdf >, 4 
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 ‘Other considerations apart, the Board has no reason to believe that there is any 
significant demand that self-employed barristers should be permitted to engage in 
such work; and if they were so permitted there would be far-reaching 
implications for their training and regulation.’ 
Just over a year later in September 2010 in the Regulating Entities consultation there had been 
a change and the position was that if BSB regulated entities should be able to conduct litigation, 
then so too should self-employed barristers. It is perhaps telling that when the context of the 
decision shifted from self-employed practice to entity regulation the direction of the decision 
changed, and this is an area where it appears fairly clear that the motivation for the change is 
based on the model of the entity rather than the individual practitioner, and a reorientation of 
the BSB’s conception of its regulatory role. 
In the latter Regulating Entities consultation the BSB considered the benefits of litigation rights 
to be consumer choice and competition. Consumer choice was seen to be enhanced by avoiding 
the extra expense of instructing a solicitor, following the Office of Fair Trading’s view on this 
point.46 It listed other benefits but these related to entities having litigation rights, and a major 
tenet of the approach to litigation rights for self-employed barristers seems to be harmonisation 
of what individual barristers can do with what entities can do. Disadvantages were 
acknowledged to be the extension beyond the Bar’s traditional remit and traditional skills base, 
loss of specialism (seen as reducing the quality of service for the client), and increased 
overheads. A further risk was seen to be convergence between barristers’ and solicitors’ 
professions. This was seen to have the potential to be contrary to the regulatory objective of 
‘encouraging an independent, strong, diverse and effective legal profession’47 and contrary to 
46 Office of Fair Trading, 2001, Competition in the Professions – A Report by the Director General of 
Fair Trading
47 Legal Services Act 2007 s1(f), although note the use of the singular form of ‘profession’
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the wishes of 88% of barristers. The BSB argued that a distinction would still persist in that 
barristers would remain prohibited from undertaking general conduct of a client’s affairs, and 
therefore from acting on a retainer as general counsel for any particular client.48 Specifically in 
relation to self-employed barristers it cited its own survey result that 52% of barristers felt that 
self-employed barristers should be able to engage in litigation, but against that it recognised 
the risk that the demands of an advocacy based practice could impinge on proper management 
of litigation.49 
The advantages offered by the consultation paper seem weak when considered in context. The 
promise of lower consumer costs is diluted by the paper’s admission that overheads would 
increase; and secondly an increase in competitiveness or consumer choice must be balanced 
against a potential drop in quality from loss of specialisation and conflicting obligations. 
However, where a traditional professional concern (specialisation, expertise, conflict of duties, 
quality) came up against a more neoliberal value (competitiveness, market choice), the BSB 
gave priority to the latter. Market liberalisation (as between branches of the profession) and an 
increase in consumer choice prevailed.
Where the profession raised concerns over fusion between the solicitor and barrister branches 
of the legal profession the BSB drew direct comparisons with the awarding of higher court 
rights to solicitors, which had not had as high take-up as anticipated. It also pointed to the areas 
where the Bar would not be competing with solicitors, namely conducting client affairs, mass 
conveyancing (not only reserved to solicitors), and will writing (not reserved to legal 
professionals at all in England and Wales). 
48 BSB Regulating Entities (n 32), 27-33
49 Ibid, 27-33
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‘The role of solicitors and barristers will therefore remain in many respect distinct even 
though there will be some increase in the range of work they can both do and in the area 
of overlap.’50 
Responses to the consultation highlighted concerns about the corresponding reduction in 
expertise, which ran contrary to the public interest. The BSB countered this argument with 
reference to practice in other jurisdictions, and by citing the quality assurance measures such 
as the Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates. Consultation responses also raised concerns 
about the risk that newly qualified barristers may be given administrative litigation tasks, 
lessening their chance to develop their advocacy skills. Again the BSB relied upon a somewhat 
vague comparison with ‘other jurisdictions’. As discussed above, the authorisation process 
increases this risk.  
There was a dismissal of both concerns of lack of specific professional identity and worries 
about the deskilling at the junior end of the bar. Loss of identity seems to be a major concern 
both in the consultation document and in the responses, including a slide into a hybrid of 
generalist approach to the different branches and role of the profession with a particularly 
negative impact on junior barristers who might be pressured into ‘performing roles equivalent 
to those of solicitors.’51 The BSB had initially proposed that any litigation service must be 
ancillary to advocacy services, which would have guarded against these concerns to some 
degree, and the Access to the Bar Committee also proposed a similar rule. The BSB ultimately 
decided against this on the basis that it would be impractical to define any such rule but also 
because the restrictions on handling client money would make it unlikely that litigation would 





be exercised except as ancillary to advocacy in any case. The BSB drew attention to what it 
perceived to be the benefits to the public of BSB regulated entities being able to perform a 
wider range of services and lack of ‘an identifiable public interest reason’ to maintain the 
restriction. This assertion is somewhat curious in light of the paper’s identification of risks of 
increased overheads (and therefore presumably increased cost to the client), lowering of quality 
through reduced specialisation and expertise, loss of distinct identity and difficulties managing 
conflicting obligations. The concerns from 2009 of ‘far reaching implications for training and 
regulation’52 appear to have been assuaged by the introduction of a self-assessment 
questionnaire for barristers who are not required to have any specific training to undertake this 
work. 
It is an unavoidable conclusion that the BSB was either overstating the implications of 
introducing litigation rights in 2009 or has been downplaying them since 2010. No empirical 
research appears to have been carried out in the interim, other than the consultation in which 
the BSB had already made a provisional decision to allow litigation from the outset, although 
the consultation paper quotes a lengthy paragraph from a letter from the Office of Fair Trading 
to the Legal Services Board in which there is an emphasis on cost savings.53 Here then a set of 
concerns centring on individual professional identity, distinctiveness and quality, all features 
of a neo-contractual approach are largely dismissed in favour of an approach which would open 
up the market and provide a suitable environment for entities to operate successfully. This 
suggests that the BSB is shifting closer towards an organisational regulatory model, eschewing 
its more traditional functionalist approach.
The relatively sudden volte-face to favour litigation rights therefore starts to disclose an 
52 BSB Structure of Self Employed Practice (n 45), 4
53 BSB Regulating Entities (n 32), 27
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increasingly market based orientation for change, with a sweeping away of old concerns that 
were more tied up in traditional notions of professionalism of professional duty, distinctiveness 
of identity, and specialisation. This is accompanied by a light touch licencing procedure that 
has scope to contribute to stratification of the profession in less clear cut ways than the pre-
existing distinctions between barrister and solicitor. Again we see the BSB tailoring its 
regulatory regime to the needs of entities. This is particularly apparent in the reversal of 
position on litigation rights once entity regulation entered the field.  
Discussion
In the BSB’s approach to entity regulation we see the diminishing importance of individual 
professional status as the status of the entity rises. As barristers become sources of profit 
within these entities it seems likely that the logic of the market will both facilitate, and be 
given increasing importance by, a corresponding shift to the discourse of organizational 
professionalism at the Bar. Whilst there is some ambiguity as to the motivation of the BSB in 
matching the values of entities to the values associated with individual professionalism, the 
motivation in the case of litigation rights seems far more clearly related to the needs of 
entities and makes this ambiguity seem far more likely to represent a recognition of the value 
of the discourse of professionalism. This clarity is revealed by the complete turn around in 
explicitly stated positions on litigation rights once the needs of the entity are recognised and 
supported by a repeated favouring of neoliberal values over traditional neo-contractual traits 
of occupational professionalism. 
These changes in the rules lead to potential changes in the working practices of the Bar, 
which make the shift to organizational professionalism more likely. The transparency that 
entities bring to the working practices of the barristers working within them allows 
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technological advances, in terms of both regulatory technology54 and information technology 
to accelerate and maximise the productivity and profitability of entities who wish to take 
advantage of these.
Barristers have to date operated in a highly traditional mode, somewhat sheltered from external 
forces by restrictions placed upon them. Prior to the changes described, the nature of the 
restrictions on barristers working together meant that they had not begun developing 
partnership models in the same way that solicitors had been able to. This preserved a very 
bespoke and somewhat idiosyncratic way of working that makes the analogy Kritzer55 used to 
analyse the decline of the professions particularly salient.
Kritzer compared the decline of professions to the decline of craftsmen through the 
industrialisation process of the nineteenth century and described post-professionalism as being 
driven by loss of exclusivity, increased segmentation and specialisation, and increases in 
technological solutions. In these conditions a process of bureaucratization leads to a loss of 
control of the production by producers described by Abel.56 Kritzer ties this to the 
rationalisation of professional knowledge and professional tasks, and of particular relevance 
notes the tendency to break down complex processes into their component parts that, 
developing the analogy, when combined with technological advances allowed craftsmen to be 
replaced by factory workers. Whilst this process acted upon the production of physical products 
in that setting, in the professional setting we see a similar process acting upon the production 
of knowledge based products. Barristers, in their model of lone working, and responsibility for 
54 Including regulatory changes pre-dating entity regulation, such as direct access, which may now be 
seen to have new potential.
55 Herbert M Kritzer, ‘The Professions are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a 
Postprofessional World’ (1999) 33(3) Law & Society Review 713
56 Abel, The Legal Profession (n 3)
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an entire product once instructed, perhaps now typify the craftsman more than any other branch 
of the legal profession, and are in their predominant mode of practice the least bureaucratized 
legal profession. The restriction against working in any form of corporate structure, including 
even partnership, no doubt leads to the retention of this mode of production preventing the 
barrister from easily breaking down her production process into delegable tasks. 
The advent of the entity has the potential to expose barristers’ working practices to new profit 
focussed actors, and in doing so to change the nature of those practices. Under the model of 
lone working any benefit derived from technical assistance would be realised by the sole 
practitioner, but would be invisible to any other observer or process. The barrister is in many 
ways a ‘black box’ where instructions go in and product comes out, with any processes taking 
place within the box being largely irrelevant and possibly invisible to the rest of the world. 
Whilst delegation to others has therefore remained difficult or impossible, delegation to 
technology remained unseen and hidden. However, the advent of the entity has the potential to 
make working with others possible, and to make any delegation to technology visible. The first 
of these is an obvious outcome of entity regulation and leads to the latter. As barristers begin 
working with others (even other barristers) in corporate structures their practices become a 
matter of concern for those corporate structures, and there working practices fall more in line 
with an organizational form of professionalism. 
Where efficiency becomes a key driver then technological delegation shifts from being a time 
saver to being a cost saver as the individual barrister’s time becomes a human resource of the 
entity with an associated cost. This then places technology as part of a picture where processes 
can become rationalised and certain tasks in the process require only a narrow skill set. This 
allows for tasks to be delegated to the cheapest producer, be that a barrister, a pupil, a solicitor, 
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a legal executive, a paralegal or an algorithm. Whilst Goulandris,57 after examining the 
development of active marketing at the Bar, concludes that the changes ‘do not appear to have 
undermined core professional values of individual autonomy, expertise or collegiality’, those 
changes were introduced long before entity regulation and for the reasons described above this 
more recent change has far greater disruptive potential. 
The extent to which the professionals themselves, the barristers, assimilate into or resist this 
new mode of professionalism will of course only become apparent in time. As noted by Boon,58 
the narrative of the barristers’ profession has historically been more related to liberalisation in 
the political and legal spheres as compared to the ‘solicitors’ narrative [which] is aligned with 
economic liberalisation and the evolution of a capitalist economy.’59 Arguably this may make 
barristers more likely to resist (or alternatively, less likely to embrace) market focused changes. 
It should be noted however that there are some indications of sections of the Bar being willing 
to embrace the drive towards increased commerciality, for example through the increased use 
of practice managers or pro-active senior clerks overseeing multiple levels of management and 
having significant input into business development.60 There is also the possibility that even a 
small degree of assimilation will remove strategies to resist these changes by taking the 
decisions about the working lives of barristers away from the barristers themselves, and into 
the hands of those controlling the entities (who may be barristers too, but are likely to be a 
smaller, more elite, group). As Sommerlad has pointed out ‘As soon as it is conceded that 
professional knowledge and expertise may be subjected to analysis in terms of its component 
57 Goulandris (n 20), 295
58 Andrew Boon, ‘The Legal Professions’ New Handbooks: Narratives, Standards and Values’ (2016) 
19(2) Legal Ethics 207
59 Ibid 
60 Goulandris (n 20), 272
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skills, then that professional knowledge and expertise no longer belongs entirely to either the 
profession or the individual [lawyer] but inheres in procedures and machines.’ 61 
On the one hand the opening up of the playing field may drive barristers into entities which 
eventually but inexorably lead to the rationalisation, segmentation and deprofessionalisation of 
much of their work. On other hand the pattern the initial uptake, if maintained (and it is worth 
considering that this may be the pattern precisely because it is the initial uptake), suggests that 
barristers may successfully resist this by subversively using the innovative regime to stay 
exactly where they are (only in a potentially more tax efficient way). It may be that the outcome 
lies in hands that have never touched the dining tables of any Inn, and that the uptake of BSB 
entity status by individuals authorised by other regulators will leave individual barristers with 
no choice other than to compete with these advocacy and litigation focussed entities by 
producing new models of their own. The introduction of entity regulation appears to be a 
tipping point that makes it likely that the discourse of organizational professionalism will come 
to take precedence over occupational forms at the Bar. The recent regulatory strategy of the 
BSB has shifted in ways that improve their position to operate within this environment, with 
an increased focus of the needs of entities. This is made apparent not just through the 
framework for entity regulation but also through development of rules in other areas, which 
focus on the needs of entities, as shown through the example of litigation rights. It allows the 
BSB better to operate in a market of legal regulators, to provide a tailored solution to all who 
wish to specialise in providing litigation and advocacy services to the public or via solicitors. 
It carves out a delineated market for itself and in doing so brings a range of legal professionals 
(and others) within its scope.
61 Sommerlad, Managerialism and the Legal Profession (n 15), 182
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